
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
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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY: East and West German representatives begin substantive negotiations today to work out details of the Four Power Berlin Agreement.

The stalemate over the German-language translation of the accord was broken on 29 September when the West Germans gave up their insistence that the two sides use a common German-language text. At the same time, Pankow's acceptance of virtually all of Bonn's revisions of a draft Postal and Telecommunications (PTT) Agreement led to its signing on 30 September. Federal Republic negotiator Bahr hopes to take up with his East German counterpart Kohl the more sensitive subject of transit between West Berlin and West Germany and traffic between East and West Germany. Bonn is hopeful that since Pankow has recognized the Federal Republic's authority to negotiate for West Berlin in the PTT agreement, it will permit all West German - West Berlin transit to be negotiated in the Bahr-Kohl talks. East Germany heretofore has insisted that it will negotiate only with the West Berlin Senat on the transit of West Berliners to West Germany.

The shelving of the textual problem also has cleared the way for the West Berlin Senat to resume on Monday parallel negotiations with East Germany on inner-Berlin matters. Preliminary contacts on such subjects as small exchanges of territory along the borders have left Senat officials optimistic.

East Germany's acceptance of West Germany's revisions in the PTT draft is probably seen in Bonn as the first fruit of Chancellor Brandt's meeting with Brezhnev two weeks ago in the Crimea.

Pankow, despite its interest in quick progress, will engage

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in hard bargaining for further concessions. Moscow, however, has an overriding interest in completing the talks in order to move on to the formal signing of the Berlin Agreement and to Bonn's ratification of the German-Soviet Treaty of 1970; it will therefore not permit Pankow to stall indefinitely.

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FRANCE: Paris is conducting a diplomatic campaign designed to slow momentum toward force reduction talks and to build support for a Conference on European Security (CES) as the next step in European detente.

During his recent meeting with Secretary Rogers in New York, French Foreign Minister Schumann reaffirmed Paris' opposition to mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). Calling MBFR a "dangerous idea," Schumann expressed concern that Brandt and Brezhnev had already reached some agreement on the subject during their meeting in mid-September. He argued that no matter what precautions were taken, force reductions would result in a "neutralist zone" in Europe.

While the French previously have warned that MBFR would create a wave of neutralism in Europe, Schumann's use of the phrase "neutralist zone" appears to be an even more pointed attempt to play on fears of a Bonn-Moscow rapprochement which would eventually lead to a neutral Germany.

The logical next step for France would be to attempt obstructionist tactics in NATO. Paris is sending only an "observer" to the NATO deputy foreign minister's meeting on MBFR scheduled for 5-6 October.

The French have coupled all their anti-MBFR statements with praise for a CES, but France also has its own special views on the form of such a

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conference.	25X1
As President Pompidou recently explained, Paris wants further detente in the context of a CES, but no diminution of defense capacity in West-	25X1
ern Europe.	25X1
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
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USSR-SUDAN: Moscow is counting on the mediation efforts of its allies in the third world to improve its relations with the Sudan. 25X1 Egypt and Syria have intervened on behalf of Moscow in order to ease the strains in Soviet-Sudanese relations in the wake of Khartoum's repression of Communists. described the Arab efforts as unsuccessful so far and added that India currently is making a strong effort at Moscow's beheat. 25X1 Moscow's behavior suggests a desire to remove the aftereffects of the abortive Communist complete the Arab efforts as unsuccessful so far and added that India currently is making a strong effort at Moscow's beheat. 25X1 The Soviets probably also are concerned that continuation of the quarrel would enhance Paking's influence in the area, and would add a further irritant to Moscow's relations with Egypt. Numayri, meanwhile, appears to be getting conflicting advice on whether to improve relations with the Soviets. Some of Numayri's closest advisers are urging him to resume cooperation with the Soviets. On the other hand, at least two of Numayri's cabinet members are exhibiting strong anti-Soviet satements. At any rate, the President continues to make anti-Soviet statements and reportedly has set time limits on the presence of some Soviet advisory personnel in the Sudan	•	Approved For Release 2006/11/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A020100090002-6	25X1
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YEMEN (SANA) - SAUDI ARABIA: Sana has accepted a badly needed \$11.1-million loan from Saudi Arabia. Some \$6.2 million already has been transferred and more will be transferred in October and December 1971. Repayment of both principal and interest is not to begin until 1974; the rate of interest is six percent, but the first two years are interest-free. The loan at first was rejected by the Yemeni consultative council because it felt that the prime minister should have obtained a larger loan from the Saudis. Government debts, including repayments on foreign loans, totaled a reported \$186 million as of July 1971 and the 1971/72 budget may be in deficit by as much as \$35 million, which is more than 60 percent of total estimated expenditures.

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